“Nazi Punks, Fuck Off”: The Energizing Youth Appeal of the Alt-Right’s Punk Rock Propaganda
april 2017
During and after the 2016 Presidential Election, Donald Trump consistently surprised pundits, journalists, and political experts with his success. Many of these commentators struggled to reach for an explanation. Blame was variously placed on polling practices, fake news, Russian intervention and rural American bigotry. It is unlikely that any one explanation can fully account for Trump’s success. But during the election the finger was increasingly pointed to a diffuse political group that has come to be known as the “alt-right”. In his piece in The New Yorker titled, “Trolls for Trump”, Andrew Marantz defines the alt-right as “a loose online affiliation of white nationalists, neo-monarchists, masculinists, conspiracists, belligerent nihilists, and social media trolls.” (Marantz, 2016). Those aligned with the alt-right’s various factions are who Hilary Clinton referred to when she claimed that “you could put half of Trump’s supporters into what I call the basket of deplorables.” On numerous occasions racist, misogynist, and xenophobic alt-right ( or “alt-light”) figure Milo Yiannopoulos has declared that “Trump is the new punk rock.”. At one event Yiannopoulos says, “What do you do if you want to piss off your teachers, piss off your parents, piss off your friends, be ejected from polite society and in all other ways be thought of as an untouchable miscreant? Vote for Donald Trump!”. Journalists and critics have also caught on to the alt-right and Trump’s attitudinal similarity to the sneering aggression of punk, penning articles like, “Is Trumpism the new Punk Rock?” and “Donald Trump—Sex Pistol”. In this essay, I aim to assess some of the characteristics and roles of the alt-right’s punk rock appeal. I’ll look at how the alt-right channels and reflects punk characteristics like aggression, irreverence, and distain for perceived authorities and traditions as well as its ability to forge a community in opposition to a mainstream or dominant culture. Then I’ll turn my attention towards the propagandistic efficacy of this punk rock appeal. I will focus particularly on the movement’s appeal to young people and the question of why this kind of propaganda may be particularly suited to a campaign or election. But first, I will look at one of the movement’s more explicit connections to punk, one-time cofounder of the edgy and black clad Vice Media and former punk, Gavin McInnes.
The title graphic for Gavin McInnes’ short video segments featured on Canadian right wing media outlet The Rebel feature a bearded McInnes wearing hipster-esque horn rimmed glasses. The text hilariously reads, “Re: This content is rated “Rebellious” viewer discretion is advised includes satire & mature content.” In this particular video, McInnes is wearing a black studded vest, trucker cap, and a white t-shirt which shows his tattooed forearms. His attire is a departure from his usual slick suits which add a traditionalism and professionalism to his otherwise rugged and “rebellious” aesthetic. Here McInnes is drawing from his punk roots, and the lyrics of some of his favorite old bands, to call for “punk rock unity” on the right amid post election fragmentation. In the video McInnes claims, “I’m basically an anarchist, I’m a punk rocker.” But Mcinnes’ connection to the actual punk music scene is too literal to really capture how the alt-right makes an appeal to rebellious youth. Much of the movement’s punk rock appeal has very little to do with the actual history or legacy of punk and much more to do with the anger and irreverence of the punk rock attitude. What McInnes’ punk rock costume and warning of “rebellious content” does indicate is that the alt-right’s allusions to punk are likely not an accident, but instead are often the result of conscious efforts to align the politics of the alt-right, with a punk like culture of rebellion.
Perhaps one of the alt-right’s most striking similarities to punk culture is its irreverence for anything the “dominant” culture may consider sacred or above reproach. In a Breitbart article by Milo Yianoppoulos and Allum Bokhari called, “An Establishment Conservative’s Guide to the Alt-Right”, the authors attempt to break down the alt-right into categories which range from “Intellectuals” to the Neo-Nazi, “1488Rs” (Bokhari & Yiannopoulos, 2016). Yianoppoulos and Bokhari call one of these groups, “The Meme Team”. They claim that this category is comprised of “young rebels” who are not ideologically motivated but are instead driven by a “mischievous urge to blaspheme, break all the rules and say the unsayable.” (Bokhari & Yiannopoulos, 2016). It is claimed that these groups are reacting to an overstepping of political correct culture by offending the liberal center with racist, misogynist and other grotesque content. They use methods like “trolling” or “shitposting” to deliberately offend others online, sometimes by trivializing and making fun of events as serious as the Holocaust or the Bosnian genocide and often by evoking Nazi or fascist imagery. The result of this behaviour is undoubtedly abhorrent, and we should not take their claims about the draws and distinctions of the alt-right at face value. The authors compare the alt-right to the counterculture of the 1960’s and claim that it holds a similar appeal. “it promises fun, transgression, and a challenge to social norms they just don’t understand,” (Bokhari &Yiannopoulos, 2016). The Sex Pistols and their entourage would also often appropriate swastikas and other fascist iconography in order to cause controversy. This was to a very different political and artistic ends—partially to critique the fascist aesthetic of 70s stadium rock—but the use of transgressive symbols in youth culture is not new. The secret in the case of the alt-right is that by rebelling against a perceived liberal elite, they are actually functioning to uphold social norms of patriarchy, white supremacy, and colonialism. The shift towards a more liberal culture which is nonetheless based on the same structures of power allows those who represent some of the most boring and long held conservative beliefs to feel like they are being edgy, rebellious and transgressive by causing outrage online. But whether this feeling of transgression is real or imagined is largely irrelevant to the group’s ability to energize and recruit. The bottom line from a persuasion point of view is that for a long time in America, offending older generations and causing panic in mainstream media has been a primary source of fun and excitement for American youth. The online culture of the alt-right encouraged using humor, mocking, and insults towards their political opponents in ways that the liberal conventions of civil political dialog often forbid. They allowed young people, in this case largely white men, to feel they had a place to express their aggression in ways that were perceived as fun and transgressive. In both punk rock and the alt-right these transgressions were not only a source of fun, they also function to forge a sense of community which is crucial to the propaganda of any political movement.
The transgressive culture of the alt-right serves two primary propagandistic functions. It makes the movement appear fun and edgy, while also establishing a method of identifying insiders and outsiders, and distinguishing between true believers, and “normies” or “cucks”. In alt-right circle’s, to be a cuck, or “cuckservative” is roughly comparable to being labelled a sell-out in the punk scene. It’s a term used to describe people who would rather avoid being ostracized by the establishment than committing themselves to any faction of the alt-right. The irony is perhaps that this kind of identification often causes just as much division as it does unity. There is always someone who is more punk, accusing everyone else of being sell outs. In the case of the alt-right this leads to a downward spiral of extreme views, with each further rotation accusing the rest of cuckery. This tendency towards further extremism in order to gain authenticity and acceptance both ensures a competitive level of ideological and performative devotion, and a level of perpetual infighting and accusations. But despite the fractured nature of the alt-right, their specific and unorthodox methods of communication, based on internet culture from sites like 4chan and reddit, maintain a somewhat common language which is unifying to the group and alienating to outsiders. Their vague, ironic humor and cynical detachment contribute greatly to the building of a community of “authentic” and understanding insiders, while making outsiders feeling ignorant or confused. Perhaps one of the best examples of this phenomenon comes in the form of Pepe the cartoon frog.
Pepe the frog started as an innocent comic character created by Matt Furie in 2006 (Furie, 2016). In the years since, Pepe has become a meme, the backdrop for various bad jokes and cultural references. But as Olivia Nuzzi explains in her article, “How Pepe the Frog Became a Nazi Trump Supporter and Alt-Right Symbol”, Pepe was co-opted by the alt-right as part of a concerted effort by a small group of young white nationalists. The phenomenon of using a meme—a medium which is constantly changing in meaning—as a political mascot is complex and ideologically loaded. But the interchangeable meanings of Pepe are precisely what makes it such valuable pieces of propaganda. The appropriation of an innocent and rather silly looking cartoon for transgressive and offensive messaging perfectly aligns with the alt-right’s sense of humor. The combination of the cute and innocent with the grotesque is common in alt-right culture. Pepe memes are also often somewhat difficult to interpret. A “normie” will always only be guessing just how seriously to take an image of Pepe holding a copy of Mien Kampf or dressed as Donald Trump. Outsiders don’t know whether to panic and call it a hate crime or resign themselves to a joke they just must not be getting. This is exactly how the alt-right wants their memes to function. No matter how the mainstream media responds to Pepe—and respond they did—their outrage or attempts to draw meaning from the images was something that those in the alt-right could bask in together. Nuzzi’s article explains the joy and amusement that these white nationalists felt as they watched politicians and the media try to decode their smirking green creation. The impenetrability of Pepe by the mainstream culture acts as a reminder to those in the alt-right that they are “different”. To use a term they use to pejoratively describe “social justice warriors”, the ignorance of the mainstream media regarding their sense of humor, their language, and their imagery lets them feel like they are their own special “snowflakes”. This allows the alt-right to further position themselves against what they frame as the dominant culture. Being against something which is perceived as bigger and more dominant is a tenant of conservative politics and most countercultures, including punk. But the co-opting of Pepe and the establishment’s subsequent struggle to interpret it also allows for a very public affirmation of community among those who reside within alt-right circles. It lets groups and individuals who are ideologically varied and geologically diffuse feel like they understand something which others do not. It allows them to feel like they are a part of something, and if there is anything young people want, its that. However, the fetishization of transgression and emphasis on traditional conservative values harbor a contradiction which greatly limits the propagandistic efficacy of much of the alt-right’s rebellious messaging.
The “punk rock appeal” which I have been describing is likely most effective as what Jacques Ellul calls “agitation propaganda” (Ellul, 71). Trump, and figures more directly involved with the alt-right have consistently referred to their ideas as part of a revolutionary “movement”. Propaganda of transgression, fun, and a delineation between insiders and outsiders is effective in mobilizing energy over a short period of time, but it cannot be sustained without that energy turning against itself. As Ellul writes regarding the limits of agitation propaganda, “The individual cannot be made to live in a state of perpetual enthusiasm and insecurity. After a certain amount of combat he needs a respite and a familiar universe to which he is accustomed.” (Ellul, 73). Now that the alt-right’s chosen candidate is in power, there is little to unify the rebellious energy of its desperate factions. Furthermore, the movement is hampered by the fact that its revolutionary nature is ultimately a lie, an edgy punk rock packaging of old ideas. As Angela Nagle notes about the alt-right in her piece, “Paleocons for Porn”,
“When liberals are no longer in power, the philosophical irreconcilability between its paleo-conservatism, which aims for return to traditional marriage while disapproving of porn and promiscuity, and the amoral libertine Internet culture from which all the real energy has emerged, will soon begin to show.” (Nagle, 2017)
Though this may be true, and agitation propaganda is indeed limited in its uses, the alt-right was nonetheless able to contribute to making its candidate the President of the United States.
Leading up to the 2016 Presidential election, factions of the alt-right were able to appear as a fresh and subversive alternative to established politics. Despite its hateful core, the movement was able to brand itself as cool, fun, and rebellious in a manner which is more often associated with the counter-cultures of the left. They channelled the type of anger, irreverence and distain for the status quo which characterized the punk scenes of years past and reengineered them for a new online political environment. Up against the embodiment of establishment politics which Hilary Clinton represented, this punk rock appeal was unbelievably effective in creating a community to rally behind an unorthodox politician like Donald Trump. I hope this essay does not appear to praise the alt-right’s utilization of punk attitudes for its own propagandistic ends because this is far from the case. Ultimately their efforts are really as pathetic as the middle aged McInnis quoting song lyrics and wearing studded leather, and while these communicative strategies may have influenced the aesthetic of the alt-right, its basic appeals are still old-fashioned racism and misogyny. Instead, it comes from a place of frustration in the inability of progressive politics to mobilize similar energy when it is arguably more compatible with a political movement which actually does aim to disrupt status quo notions of patriarchy, white supremacy, and capitalism in a meaningful way. The humor, irreverence, and irony of the alt-right is ultimately incompatible with many of the basic structures that it seeks to uphold; this is not so with a politics which actually seeks to tear down and replace those structures. It is undoubtable that whether it be the result of cultural, economic, or political disenfranchisement, there is an abundance of rebellious political energy available to be mobilized. But in order to involve young people in politics, it has to be fun, exciting, and sometimes offensive to conventional respectability politics. Hilary Clinton was criticized by many in the political establishment for venturing to pontificate about placing the worst of Trump’s supporters into a “basket of deplorables”. This was seen by some to violate rules of political civility by insulting a portion of the electorate. But maybe instead of a progressive politics which uses words like deplorable, metaphors about baskets, and ended each statement with a question mark, we needed one which would quote the Dead Kennedy’s in saying, “Nazi Punks, Fuck Off!”
Works Cited
Allum Bokhari & Milo Yiannopoulos29 Mar 20160. "An Establishment Conservative's Guide To The Alt-Right." Breitbart. N.p., 30 Mar. 2016. Web. Apr. 2017.
Ellul, Jacques. Propaganda; the Formation of Men's Attitudes. New York: Knopf, 1971. Print.
Furie, Matt. "Pepe the Frog Creator: He Is Not Racist or a Hate Symbol." Time. Time, 13 Oct. 2016. Web. Apr. 2017.
Galupo, Scott. "Is Trumpism the New Punk Rock?" The Week - All You Need to Know about Everything That Matters. N.p., 02 Mar. 2017. Web. Apr. 2017.
Marantz, Andrew. "Trolls for Trump." The New Yorker. The New Yorker, 20 Oct. 2016. Web. Apr. 2017.
Milo: Trump Is the New Punk Rock. Perf. Milo Yiannopoulos. YouTube. N.p., 22 Sept. 2016. Web.
Nagle, Angela. "Paleocons for Porn." Jacobin. N.p., 22 Feb. 2017. Web. Apr. 2017.
Nuzzi, Olivia. "How Pepe the Frog Became a Nazi Trump Supporter and Alt-Right Symbol." The Daily Beast. The Daily Beast Company, 26 May 2016. Web. Apr. 2017.
Parker, James. "Donald Trump, Sex Pistol." The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, 13 Sept. 2016. Web.
The Right Needs a Dose of Punk Rock Unity. Perf. Gavin McInnes. YouTube. Rebel Media, 6 Jan. 2017. Web.